International Relations and Diplomacy

Nepal in Multilateral Forums: Leverage, Challenges and the Way Forward

Introduction

Nepal's foreign policy is built on the pillars of the UN Charter, non-alignment, Panchsheel and peaceful coexistence. As a small, landlocked and resource-constrained state, multilateralism is not a choice but a necessity for Nepal — it is the principal instrument through which it seeks security, development finance, market access, transit rights and international standing. Nepal joined the UN on 14 December 1955 and has since been an active member of NAM (founding member, Belgrade 1961), SAARC (1985), BIMSTEC (1997), WTO (2004) and the G77.

How Nepal Has Leveraged Multilateral Membership

1. Peacekeeping and global security. Nepal has contributed over 1,00,000 peacekeepers to more than 40 UN missions since 1958 (UNOGIL, Lebanon). It is consistently among the top troop- and police-contributing countries, and the Birendra Peace Operations Training Centre (Panchkhal) has become a regional training hub. This "peacekeeping dividend" has given Nepal disproportionate visibility, credibility and a moral voice far beyond its size.

2. UN system positions. Nepal served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1969–70 and 1988–89, and has announced its candidature for a future term. It was elected to the UN Human Rights Council (2018–2020) and has served on ECOSOC and various subsidiary bodies. It has ratified most core human rights treaties, using treaty bodies to press for accountability and technical assistance.

3. Advocacy for LDCs and LLDCs. As a double-landlocked LDC, Nepal has used the UN LDC conferences, the Almaty and Vienna Programmes of Action for LLDCs, and the G77 to push for preferential market access, Aid for Trade, transit rights under UNCLOS Part X and the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked States. Its scheduled LDC graduation in 2026 is itself a product of sustained multilateral engagement.

4. Trade and transit diplomacy. Nepal was the first LDC to accede to the WTO through a full accession process (2004), using the forum to raise freedom-of-transit issues and secure technical assistance. Bilateral transit arrangements with India (1950/1999 treaty) and China (2016 Transit and Transport Agreement) rest on multilateral norms of landlocked states' right of access to the sea.

5. Climate and mountain diplomacy. Through the Mountain Initiative (2010), consistent interventions at COPs, and the Sagarmatha Sambaad (2025), Nepal has framed climate change as a mountain vulnerability issue, seeking adaptation finance and loss-and-damage support.

6. Regional and migrant-worker platforms. Nepal hosted the 18th SAARC Summit (Kathmandu, 2014), uses BIMSTEC for connectivity and energy cooperation, and advances migrant workers' rights through the Colombo Process, Abu Dhabi Dialogue and the Global Compact for Migration.

Challenges in Multilateral Diplomacy

• Structural weakness: landlockedness, small economy, dependence on transit through neighbours, and vulnerability to external shocks.
• Resource and capacity constraints: a small foreign service, limited diplomatic missions (about 30 embassies), thin thematic expertise, inadequate research and data, and high staff turnover.
• Geopolitical balancing: pressure to align with India or China, and the risk of being drawn into great-power rivalry; erosion of the non-aligned space.
• Weak coordination: fragmented handling of multilateral issues across ministries, poor follow-up on commitments and weak inter-agency information flow.
• Limited bargaining power: as a small LDC, Nepal's voice in bodies like the WTO, IMF and climate funds is marginal; commitments by developed countries on finance and technology remain unmet.
• Graduation risks: loss of LDC-specific concessions (preferential market access, TRIPS flexibilities, concessional finance) without a smooth transition mechanism.
• Under-representation: few Nepalis in international secretariats and expert bodies; limited agenda-setting capacity.

Measures to Enhance Nepal's Multilateral Role

1. Institutional strengthening: upgrade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and permanent missions in New York, Geneva and Vienna; establish a well-funded Foreign Service Institute for specialised training in trade, climate, human rights and security law.
2. Niche diplomacy: build on proven strengths — peacekeeping (expand BPOTC into a centre of excellence), mountain/climate diplomacy, LDC–LLDC advocacy and migrant-worker protection — to become a recognised "issue leader".
3. Evidence-based and coordinated diplomacy: create a standing inter-ministerial coordination mechanism, a foreign policy research cell and a national database to back Nepal's positions in negotiations.
4. Strategic candidatures and coalitions: systematically contest UN bodies and chairmanships, and build coalitions with like-minded small and landlocked states (LLDC group, G77, NAM) rather than acting alone.
5. Public, digital and diaspora diplomacy: use diaspora networks, think tanks (Institute of Foreign Affairs), academia and digital platforms to project Nepal's narrative and attract investment and tourism.
6. Smooth graduation strategy: negotiate transition support measures at the UN and WTO, and diversify export markets and transit routes to reduce vulnerability.
7. National consensus: ensure continuity and predictability in foreign policy through all-party consensus, insulating multilateral positions from domestic political flux.

Conclusion

Nepal has punched above its weight in multilateral forums — chiefly through peacekeeping, LDC/LLDC advocacy, human rights engagement and climate diplomacy — converting normative standing into tangible diplomatic gains. Yet its influence remains constrained by structural weakness, limited capacity and geopolitical pressures. By investing in institutional capacity, specialising in niche issues, coordinating effectively and building coalitions, Nepal can transform its multilateral membership from a shield for survival into a genuine instrument of influence and prosperity.

Leadership Role of Nepal in Furthering the Interests of LDCs and LLDCs

Introduction

Nepal, itself a Least Developed Country (LDC) and a Landlocked Developing Country (LLDC), has consistently acted as a bridge and advocate for these vulnerable groups in multilateral forums. Its dual identity gives it both moral authority and practical experience to champion their concerns.

Leadership Role of Nepal

1. Advocacy in the United Nations

• Nepal has consistently raised the concerns of LDCs and LLDCs at the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC and other bodies.
• It actively participated in the formulation of the Istanbul Programme of Action (IPoA, 2011–2020) for LDCs and the Vienna Programme of Action (VPoA, 2014–2024) for LLDCs.

2. Chairmanship and Membership of Key Groups

• Nepal has been an active member of the LDC Group and the LLDC Group at the UN, and has taken part in their coordination work.
• Nepal uses the Group of 77 and China platform to highlight LDC/LLDC issues.
• Nepal has consistently coordinated with the Asian Group of LLDCs to push for transit rights and trade facilitation.

3. Championing Transit Rights and Trade Facilitation

• Nepal has consistently advocated for the right of landlocked states to access the sea under UNCLOS and WTO rules.
• It has pushed for simplified transit procedures, reduction of non-tariff barriers, and implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.

4. South–South Cooperation and Regional Leadership

• Nepal promotes South–South cooperation through platforms like BIMSTEC, SAARC, and the Colombo Plan.
• It shares its own development experiences (community forestry, peacebuilding, remittance-led poverty reduction) with other LDCs.

5. Climate Change Advocacy

• As a mountain LDC, Nepal has led the call for climate finance, Loss and Damage fund, and adaptation support for vulnerable LDCs.
• It has highlighted the special vulnerability of mountain LLDCs in global climate negotiations.

6. Graduation Advocacy

• Nepal has pushed for smooth and sustainable graduation from LDC status, including extended transition periods and continued international support measures.

Measures to Further Enhance Nepal's Role

1. Strengthen Diplomatic Capacity — Expand Nepal's permanent missions and train diplomats specialized in LDC/LLDC negotiations.
2. Build Coalitions — Form stronger alliances with African and Pacific LDCs and Central Asian LLDCs for collective bargaining.
3. Host International Events — Organize UN conferences, regional summits and dialogues in Kathmandu to raise Nepal's profile.
4. Leverage Regional Forums — Use BIMSTEC and SAARC to push transit, connectivity and trade facilitation agendas.
5. Institutionalize Research — Establish a dedicated think tank on LDC/LLDC issues to produce evidence-based policy inputs.
6. Link Aid, Trade and Investment — Negotiate better terms under Aid for Trade, preferential market access and FDI for LDCs.
7. Promote Connectivity Diplomacy — Advance rail, road and digital connectivity projects linking LLDCs to transit corridors.
8. Coordinate Climate Negotiations — Lead a unified LDC/LLDC bloc on climate finance, adaptation and Loss and Damage.
9. Engage in South–South and Triangular Cooperation — Share best practices and attract partnership from emerging economies.
10. Ensure Domestic Policy Coherence — Align Nepal's own graduation strategy with its international advocacy for credibility.

Conclusion

Nepal's unique position as both an LDC and an LLDC makes it a natural spokesperson for these groups. By strengthening diplomacy, building coalitions, hosting global events and maintaining policy coherence, Nepal can elevate its leadership role and ensure that the interests of LDCs and LLDCs remain central to the international development agenda.

Major Functions of Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963

1. Introduction

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (VCDR) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963 (VCCR) are the two foundational instruments of modern diplomatic and consular law. The VCDR codifies the functions, privileges and immunities of diplomatic missions (embassies/high commissions), while the VCCR governs consular posts (consulates-general, consulates, vice-consulates). Nepal is a party to both conventions and conducts its foreign relations through these legal frameworks. The major functions provided for in these conventions are set out below.

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A. Functions of a Diplomatic Mission (Article 3, VCDR, 1961)

Article 3(1) of the VCDR lays down five major functions:

1. Representation — Representing the sending State in the receiving State. The mission acts as the official channel of communication and the visible symbol of the sending State's sovereignty.

2. Protection — Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law. This includes looking after the welfare of citizens, e.g., a Nepali embassy helping a Nepali migrant worker in distress.

3. Negotiation — Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State. Treaties, agreements and bilateral understandings are generally concluded through the mission.

4. Observation and Reporting — Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State. This is the intelligence and information-gathering function.

5. Promotion of Friendly Relations — Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. This is the basis of public and economic diplomacy.

Article 3(2) adds that nothing in the Convention prevents the performance of other functions entrusted by the sending State that are not prohibited by the law of the receiving State. In practice, this covers consular functions performed by diplomatic missions (Article 3(2) read with VCCR Article 70), protection of refugees, and representation at international organisations.

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B. Functions of a Consular Post (Article 5, VCCR, 1963)

Article 5 provides that consular functions consist, in particular, of:

1. Protecting nationals — Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law.

2. Furthering commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations — Developing commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and otherwise promoting friendly relations.

3. Issuing passports and travel documents — Issuing passports or travel documents to nationals of the sending State, and visas or other appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending State.

4. Assisting nationals — Helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the sending State.

5. Acting as notary and civil registrar — Acting as notary public, civil registrar and in similar capacities, and performing functions of an administrative nature, provided this does not conflict with the laws of the receiving State.

6. Safeguarding minors and persons with limited capacity — Safeguarding the interests of nationals of the sending State who are minors or otherwise lacking full legal capacity, particularly where guardianship or trusteeship is required.

7. Representing nationals before authorities — Representing or arranging appropriate representation for nationals of the sending State before the tribunals and other authorities of the receiving State, in accordance with the laws and practice of the receiving State.

8. Transmitting judicial and extrajudicial documents — Transmitting judicial and extrajudicial documents, or executing letters rogatory, in accordance with international agreements in force or, in their absence, in a manner compatible with the laws of the receiving State.

9. Exercising rights of supervision and inspection — Exercising rights of supervision and inspection over vessels and aircraft of the sending State, and over their crews and passengers, and rendering assistance to such vessels and aircraft.

10. Other functions — Performing any other functions entrusted to a consular post by the sending State which are not prohibited by the laws of the receiving State or to which no objection is taken by that State, or those conferred by international agreements in force between the sending and receiving States.

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C. Comparative Position

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D. Conclusion

The VCDR, 1961 and the VCCR, 1963 together form the legal backbone of diplomacy and consular relations. The diplomatic mission performs the high political functions of representation, negotiation, protection and reporting, while the consular post performs the day-to-day administrative functions of protecting nationals, issuing documents and assisting trade and navigation. Nepal, as a party to both conventions, enjoys and extends these rights and duties through its embassies and consulates abroad. The two conventions thus ensure orderly, reciprocal and peaceful conduct of international relations.

Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the conduct of relations between sovereign states and other international actors through peaceful means — negotiation, dialogue, representation and persuasion — in order to promote and protect national interest, settle disputes without resort to force, and maintain orderly international relations. It is carried out by accredited agents (diplomats, foreign ministries) and rests on the principles of sovereignty, reciprocity and non-interference in internal affairs, as codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).

Major Features of Track I Diplomacy

Track I diplomacy is the official, government-to-official channel of negotiation.

1. Official actors — conducted by heads of state/government, foreign ministers, ambassadors and accredited diplomats.
2. Formal mandate and legal standing — the negotiator speaks and commits on behalf of the state; agreements reached are binding and can take the form of treaties, accords or joint communiqués.
3. Structured and institutionalised — follows established procedures, protocol, diplomatic immunity and institutions (UN, SAARC, BIMSTEC, WTO).
4. Use of state instruments — backed by the full range of state power: recognition, sanctions, aid, treaties, even the threat of force.
5. Primacy in decision-making — it is the only track whose outcomes have legal force; Track II outputs must ultimately be fed into Track I to become policy.
6. Limitations — rigid positions, bureaucratic caution, publicity and domestic political pressure often make official channels slow or deadlocked.

Major Features of Track II Diplomacy

Track II diplomacy is unofficial, non-governmental, informal dialogue aimed at building confidence and exploring solutions outside official channels (the term was popularised by Joseph Montville, 1981).

1. Non-official actors — retired diplomats, academics, think-tank experts, journalists, business leaders, former officials and civil-society representatives.
2. No official mandate — participants speak in their personal capacity; nothing they agree is binding on the state.
3. Informal, confidential and flexible — held in retreats, seminars and workshops, free from protocol, allowing frank exchange and face-saving exploration of options.
4. Focus on relationship-building — aims at mutual understanding, trust, empathy and changing perceptions rather than immediate agreement.
5. Complementary to Track I — serves as a pre-negotiation, back-channel or post-conflict reconciliation mechanism; ideas generated are transferred to official negotiators.
6. Limitations — lack of authority and enforceability; risk of being ignored by governments; success depends on access to real decision-makers.

Relationship and Significance

The two tracks are not rivals but complements. Track II prepares the ground, tests ideas and keeps communication alive when official channels are frozen; Track I converts those ideas into binding commitments. In Nepal's context, Track II dialogue has been useful in managing relations with India and China, in Track II (and Track III) engagement during the Maoist insurgency and peace process, and in confidence-building over boundary and water-sharing issues. Hence, a healthy foreign policy uses Track I as the core and Track II as its flexible support.

Nepal–United States Relations: Current State and Policy Options

1. Current state of Nepal–US relations

Nepal and the United States established diplomatic relations in 1947, and the relationship has since matured into a broad partnership covering development cooperation, trade, investment, education, health, disaster response, and security. The current state can be assessed under the following heads:

• Diplomatic and political: Regular high-level exchanges, bilateral consultations, and visits have kept the relationship cordial. The US has consistently supported Nepal's peace process, constitution-writing, and post-earthquake reconstruction. Nepal follows a balanced, non-aligned foreign policy and has not allowed its territory to be used against any friendly country.
• Development cooperation: The US is one of Nepal's major bilateral donors through USAID, supporting education, health, agriculture, climate resilience, federalism, and good governance. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact (US$ 500 million grant) is being implemented for electricity transmission and road improvement.
• Economic and trade: The US is a significant export destination (ready-made garments, carpets, pashmina, handicrafts) and a source of FDI and remittances. However, Nepal runs a trade deficit with the US, and bilateral trade volume remains modest compared to Nepal's trade with India and China.
• Education and people-to-people ties: Thousands of Nepali students study in the US; remittances and diaspora networks strengthen people-to-people relations. The US also supports Nepal in disaster preparedness and humanitarian assistance.
• Security and defence: Limited cooperation exists in counter-terrorism, peacekeeping training, and disaster relief. Nepal contributes troops to UN peacekeeping missions where US logistical support is relevant.
• Emerging issues: Geopolitical competition between the US and China (Indo-Pacific Strategy, Belt and Road Initiative) has created pressure on Nepal. The US's Indo-Pacific Strategy and its stance on China have raised concerns in Nepal about being drawn into great-power rivalry. Similarly, Nepal's relations with India—its immediate neighbor—are deep, complex, and treaty-based (1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship), while relations with China are governed by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Boundary Treaty of 1960.

2. Policy options for Nepal to maintain friendly relations with the US while balancing immediate neighbors

Nepal's foreign policy is guided by the UN Charter, non-alignment, Panchsheel, and the principle of "amity with all, enmity with none." To maintain friendly ties with the US while balancing India and China, Nepal can adopt the following policy options:

1. Strict adherence to non-alignment and equidistance: Nepal should avoid joining any military alliance or bloc. It should not allow its territory to be used against any friendly country and should refrain from taking sides in US–China rivalry. This preserves Nepal's strategic autonomy.

2. Issue-based, multi-dimensional engagement: Nepal should engage the US on specific areas of mutual interest—trade, investment, education, health, climate change, disaster risk reduction, and technology transfer—without entering into security arrangements that could antagonize neighbors.

3. Diversification of economic and development partnerships: Nepal should diversify its trade, investment, and aid sources among the US, India, China, the EU, Japan, and others. This reduces over-dependence on any single country and increases Nepal's bargaining space.

4. Transparent and balanced implementation of agreements: Projects like the MCC Compact should be implemented with full transparency and in a manner that does not compromise Nepal's sovereignty or strategic interests. Nepal should clarify that such agreements are development-oriented, not security-oriented.

5. Strengthening bilateral mechanisms: Nepal should activate and strengthen bilateral mechanisms such as the Nepal–US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), joint commissions, and parliamentary exchanges to institutionalize cooperation.

6. Leveraging Nepal's unique position: Nepal can position itself as a bridge between the US and China, and between India and China, by promoting connectivity, transit, and regional stability. Its geo-strategic location between two large neighbors can be converted into an asset through balanced diplomacy.

7. People-to-people and educational diplomacy: Expanding educational exchanges, diaspora engagement, tourism, and cultural ties with the US helps build long-term goodwill without strategic entanglement.

8. Consistent and principled foreign policy: Nepal should follow a coherent foreign policy based on national interest, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. It should avoid abrupt shifts in alignment and maintain continuity across governments.

9. Active role in multilateral forums: Nepal should use platforms like the UN, NAM, BIMSTEC, and SAARC to promote its interests and maintain balanced relations with all major powers, including the US, India, and China.

10. Managing neighborly relations through dialogue: Nepal should resolve outstanding issues with India (e.g., border disputes, treaty revision) and China (e.g., boundary management, BRI implementation) through peaceful dialogue, while simultaneously expanding friendly ties with the US. This three-way balance is the core of Nepal's foreign policy challenge.

Conclusion

Nepal's relations with the US are friendly and development-oriented, but they must be managed carefully in the context of Nepal's geography between India and China. By adhering to non-alignment, diversifying partnerships, maintaining transparency in agreements, and pursuing issue-based engagement, Nepal can maintain and expand friendly relations with the US while safeguarding its sovereignty and balancing relations with its immediate neighbors. A stable, prosperous, and non-aligned Nepal serves the interests of all major powers and contributes to regional peace and stability.

Inherent strengths of ASEAN as a more successful regional cooperation framework compared to SAARC and BIMSTEC

1. Strong institutional architecture. ASEAN has a permanent, rules-based institutional setup — the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, the ASEAN Summit, the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the three Community Councils (Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural), and dozens of sectoral ministerial bodies. SAARC's Secretariat in Kathmandu is small and weakly mandated, and BIMSTEC's Secretariat in Dhaka is even thinner. ASEAN's institutional density gives it continuity and follow-up capacity that the other two lack.

2. Binding legal and normative framework. The ASEAN Charter (2008) gave the grouping legal personality, dispute-settlement mechanisms, and a compliance regime. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) create enforceable commitments. SAARC's legal instruments (SAFTA, SAPTA) remain largely unimplemented, and BIMSTEC has only a skeletal FTA framework still under negotiation.

3. Consensus (Musyawarah) and non-interference norms that fit the region. ASEAN's "ASEAN Way" — consultation, consensus, non-interference in internal affairs — reduces friction among politically diverse members. In SAARC, India–Pakistan hostility repeatedly paralyses the whole organisation (only 18 summits in about 40 years, none since 2014). In BIMSTEC, the same India–Pakistan and Myanmar issues spill over. ASEAN's norms convert diversity into a workable, if slow, decision-making style.

4. Economic complementarity and integration success. ASEAN has a combined GDP of roughly US$3.8 trillion and a market of over 670 million people. Intra-ASEAN trade is around 22–25 per cent of total trade, supported by the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC 2015). SAARC's intra-regional trade is only about 5 per cent of total trade, and BIMSTEC's is even lower. ASEAN's production networks, supply chains, and RCEP membership deepen interdependence.

5. Centrality in wider Asian architecture. ASEAN is the hub of the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM+). It engages all major powers — the US, China, Japan, India, Russia — through ASEAN-centred platforms. SAARC has no such convening power, and BIMSTEC, though gaining attention after 2014, is still not a major-power hub.

6. Balanced external engagement (hedging). ASEAN successfully balances China, the US, Japan, and India without becoming a proxy for any one power. This "hedging" strategy gives it strategic autonomy. SAARC is dominated by the India–Pakistan binary, and BIMSTEC is largely India-led, reducing its room for manoeuvre.

7. People-centred and socio-cultural cohesion. The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA), ASEAN People's Forum, and ASEAN Foundation build people-to-people ties. SAARC's SAARC Development Fund and BIMSTEC's limited people-to-people mechanisms are far weaker.

8. Conflict-management track record. ASEAN has helped manage the Cambodian conflict (Paris Peace Accords 1991), the South China Sea disputes (Declaration on Conduct 2002), and the Timor-Leste issue. SAARC has failed to even hold regular summits due to bilateral disputes. BIMSTEC has not faced comparable conflict-management tests but also lacks ASEAN's mechanisms.

9. Flexible, multi-speed integration. ASEAN allows members to opt out or delay (e.g., Myanmar on certain issues, Cambodia on labour). This "ASEAN minus X" formula keeps cooperation moving. SAARC's rigid consensus requirement and BIMSTEC's unanimity rule stall progress.

10. External recognition and partnership. ASEAN has Dialogue Partner status with major powers and observer status at the UN. Its brand value attracts investment and diplomatic weight. SAARC and BIMSTEC have far less external recognition.

Conclusion. ASEAN's strengths lie in its permanent institutions, binding legal framework, consensus-based norms, economic complementarity, centrality in Asian security architecture, balanced external engagement, and people-centred approach. SAARC suffers from India–Pakistan rivalry and weak institutions; BIMSTEC, though improving, still lacks ASEAN's legal depth and convening power. ASEAN's model — slow but steady, consensus-driven, and institutionally anchored — explains its relative success.

Nepal's Contribution to International Peace and Security under the UN Framework

Nepal became a member of the United Nations on 14 December 1955 and has since been one of the most consistent and trusted contributors to international peace and security, primarily through UN peacekeeping operations.

1. Long and continuous troop contribution: Nepal began contributing troops to UN peacekeeping in 1958 (UNOGIL in Lebanon) and has since participated in more than 40 missions. It is consistently ranked among the top troop- and police-contributing countries in the world. As of recent years, Nepal has deployed over 5,000 peacekeepers annually, making it one of the largest contributors globally.

2. Major missions served: Nepali peacekeepers have served in UNEF (Sinai), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNPROFOR (former Yugoslavia), UNMIK (Kosovo), MONUSCO (DR Congo), MINUSMA (Mali), UNAMID (Darfur), MINUSTAH (Haiti), UNMISS (South Sudan) and others. Nepali troops have been deployed as infantry battalions, military observers, staff officers, police and formed police units.

3. Sacrifice and professionalism: More than 80 Nepali peacekeepers have laid down their lives in the line of duty. Nepal's peacekeepers are widely respected for their discipline, impartiality, neutrality and humane conduct, which has earned the country international goodwill.

4. Leadership roles: Nepali officers have held senior positions in UN missions, including Force Commanders and Special Representatives. Nepal has also served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (1969–70, 1988–89) and contributed to UN peacebuilding efforts.

5. Other contributions: Nepal has contributed to UN humanitarian and development activities, supported disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and advocated for the interests of least developed countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) in UN forums.

In short, Nepal's contribution to UN peacekeeping has enhanced its international image as a peace-loving nation and a reliable partner in maintaining global peace and security.

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Other Prominent Areas Where Nepal Should Concentrate to Benefit from UN Membership

Nepal should now diversify its engagement with the UN beyond peacekeeping and focus on areas where it can gain maximum economic, diplomatic and developmental benefits:

1. Economic diplomacy and development financing: Nepal should actively use UN platforms (UNDP, ECOSOC, UNCTAD) to attract foreign investment, concessional loans and development assistance. It should push for fulfilment of ODA commitments by developed countries and for special support measures for LDCs and LLDCs.

2. Climate change and environmental diplomacy: As a country highly vulnerable to climate change, Nepal should strongly raise the issue of climate justice in UNFCCC forums. It should demand compensation for loss and damage, access to the Green Climate Fund and technology transfer for adaptation and mitigation.

3. Labour migration and protection of migrant workers: Nepal should use UN mechanisms (ILO, IOM, Global Compact for Migration) to ensure safe, orderly and dignified migration, and to protect the rights of Nepali migrant workers abroad.

4. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Nepal should integrate the SDGs into national planning and use UN technical and financial support to achieve targets on poverty, hunger, education, health, gender equality and employment.

5. Human rights and rule of law: Nepal should engage constructively with UN human rights bodies (OHCHR, treaty bodies, UPR) to strengthen its human rights record, which in turn improves its international credibility and access to aid and investment.

6. Peacebuilding and post-conflict experience sharing: Nepal's successful peace process can be shared with other conflict-affected countries through UN peacebuilding mechanisms, enhancing its diplomatic stature.

7. Technology, education and capacity building: Nepal should seek UN support for digital transformation, quality education, skill development and institutional capacity building to meet the demands of the 21st century.

8. Regional and multilateral cooperation: Nepal should use the UN to strengthen its role in SAARC, BIMSTEC and other regional bodies, and to promote transit rights and connectivity for landlocked countries.

Conclusion: Nepal has earned respect through peacekeeping, but to gain lasting benefit from UN membership it must shift towards economic, climate, migration and development diplomacy. By doing so, Nepal can convert its moral standing into tangible national development.

Introduction

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded between Nepal and India on 31 July 1950, together with its accompanying letters of exchange, has long been regarded by Nepali foreign policy experts as an unequal treaty. The inequality arises not so much from its formal text as from its open-ended, vaguely worded provisions and the asymmetry of power between the two parties. The main provisions that have made it unequal, and the suggestions to make it acceptable to Nepal, are clarified below.

Provisions that have made the Treaty unequal

1. Absence of reciprocity and equality clause: The Treaty does not contain an express provision affirming the sovereign equality, mutual respect for each other's independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries in a balanced manner. The preamble speaks of "everlasting peace and friendship," but the operative articles do not guarantee equal treatment.

2. Article 2 — "Special privileges" without definition: Article 2 provides that the nationals of either country shall enjoy, in the territory of the other, "the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges of a similar nature" as are enjoyed by the nationals of that country. The term "other privileges of a similar nature" is vague and open-ended. In practice, this has enabled unrestricted Indian movement, residence, property ownership, and trade in Nepal, while Nepal has not been able to secure equivalent treatment in India. This one-sided flow has demographic, economic, and security implications for Nepal.

3. Article 3 — Prior consultation on foreign relations: Article 3 obliges Nepal to inform India of any "dispute or misunderstanding" with a third country and to consult India before settling it. This provision has been interpreted by India as curtailing Nepal's independent conduct of foreign policy, though Nepal has consistently maintained that it does not limit its sovereignty. The absence of a reciprocal obligation on India makes the provision unequal.

4. Article 4 — Most-favoured-nation treatment: Article 4 grants most-favoured-nation treatment in trade and commerce, but without a clear framework of mutuality, reciprocity, and non-discrimination. This has contributed to an unequal trade relationship and a chronic trade deficit for Nepal.

5. Article 5 — Exemption from customs duty: Article 5 exempts "articles the growth, produce or manufacture" of either country from customs duty when imported into the other. This provision, combined with open borders, has exposed Nepal's nascent industries to unequal competition and has facilitated large-scale informal trade and revenue leakage.

6. Article 6 — Separate agreements: Article 6 provides that "other matters" agreed upon shall be "regulated by separate agreements." This has allowed India to negotiate subsequent agreements (e.g., on trade, transit, and water resources) from a position of strength, often on terms unfavourable to Nepal.

7. Article 7 — Duration without exit clause: Article 7 provides that the Treaty "shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by giving one year's notice." The absence of a periodic review clause and the practical difficulty of unilateral termination have made the Treaty effectively perpetual and have prevented its renegotiation in keeping with changed times.

8. Article 8 — Interpretation by both parties: Article 8 provides that "any difference arising in the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled by negotiation between the two Governments." The absence of a neutral dispute-settlement mechanism (such as arbitration or reference to the International Court of Justice) has allowed the stronger party to impose its own interpretation.

9. The accompanying letters of exchange: The letters exchanged along with the Treaty, particularly the Indian letter of 31 July 1950, refer to Nepal's "ancient relationship" and to India's "special interests" in Nepal's security. These letters have been used by India to justify a special relationship and, at times, interference in Nepal's internal and external affairs. The letters are not part of the Treaty proper, yet they have been treated as binding, which is itself an unequal feature.

10. Asymmetry in practice: Even where the text appears reciprocal, the vast difference in size, economy, and military power between the two countries has meant that the provisions operate to India's advantage. Issues such as the 1950 Treaty's linkage with the 1965 Arms Assistance Agreement, the Kalapani border dispute, the 1954 and 1960 water treaties, and the 2015 economic blockade illustrate how the Treaty's framework has been used to pressure Nepal.

Suggestions to make the Treaty acceptable to Nepal

1. Renegotiation of the Treaty: The Treaty should be renegotiated in its entirety, in keeping with the changed political, economic, and strategic context since 1950. Nepal has already raised this demand through the Eminent Persons' Group (EPG) report and various official channels.

2. Incorporation of the principle of sovereign equality: The revised treaty should expressly affirm respect for each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and non-interference in internal affairs, in a balanced and reciprocal manner.

3. Reciprocity in Article 2: The provision on residence, property, trade, and movement should be made strictly reciprocal and clearly defined, with safeguards against uncontrolled migration and its demographic and security consequences for Nepal.

4. Removal or revision of Article 3: The obligation to consult India on foreign policy matters should be deleted or made reciprocal and non-binding, so that Nepal can conduct an independent foreign policy in accordance with its national interest and the principles of the UN Charter and non-alignment.

5. Balanced trade and transit provisions: Articles 4 and 5 should be revised to ensure fair and non-discriminatory trade, protection of Nepal's infant industries, and guaranteed transit rights to and from the sea without unilateral obstruction.

6. Periodic review clause: A provision for periodic review (e.g., every ten years) should be incorporated so that the Treaty can be updated to reflect changing circumstances.

7. Neutral dispute-settlement mechanism: Article 8 should be amended to provide for arbitration or reference to the International Court of Justice in case of disputes, instead of leaving settlement solely to bilateral negotiation.

8. Clarification on the letters of exchange: The status of the 1950 letters of exchange should be clarified, and any provision implying India's "special interests" in Nepal should be removed or made reciprocal.

9. Resolution of outstanding issues: Outstanding bilateral issues such as the Kalapani border dispute, the 1954 and 1960 water treaties, and the 1965 Arms Assistance Agreement should be resolved on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and international law, as a package with the Treaty's revision.

10. Diplomatic and institutional approach: Nepal should pursue the revision through sustained diplomatic dialogue, use of the EPG mechanism, parliamentary consensus, and, if necessary, international forums, while maintaining friendly relations with India based on mutual respect and national interest.

Conclusion

The 1950 Treaty is unequal primarily because of its vague and open-ended provisions (Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8), the absence of a periodic review and neutral dispute-settlement mechanism, and the accompanying letters of exchange that imply India's special interests in Nepal. To make the Treaty acceptable to Nepal, it should be renegotiated on the basis of sovereign equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and international law, with clear provisions on trade, transit, movement, and dispute settlement. Such a revision would serve the national interest of Nepal while preserving the traditional friendship between the two countries.